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I. INTRODUCTION
After an evening of drinking at the Town Creek Saloon in Jack-
son, Mississippi, Crawford Bullock, Jr., and Ricky Tucker accepted a
ride home from Mark Dickson. ' The three men drank heavily as they
travelled toward Tucker's home. Bullock requested that Dickson
"stop the car so he could answer a call of nature."2 Upon returning
to the vehicle, Bullock heard Tucker and Dickson arguing.3 The
arguing ceased when Bullock reentered the vehicle, and they resumed
the trip with Dickson driving.4 Dickson eventually stopped the car
near a construction site, and he and Tucker started fighting.5 At some
point, Bullock held Dickson's head while Tucker struck Dickson in
the face with a whiskey bottle.6 Tucker continued to assault Dickson
until he fell to the ground and lay helpless. Tucker then smashed
Dickson in the head with a concrete block until he died.7 They subse-
quently disposed of the body, and Bullock kept Dickson's car for him-
1. For the complete factual background, see Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 693
(1986); Bullock v. Lucas, 743 F.2d 244, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1984).
2. Bullock v. Lucas, 743 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1984).
3. Id. Dickson was apparently indebted to Tucker for illicit drugs and insisted that he
had no money. He offered Tucker his auto in satisfaction of the debt.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 693 (1986).
7. Id.
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self.8 They were arrested the next day and charged with capital
murder in violation of a Mississippi statute.9 Bullock was charged
with Dickson's death in connection with the felonious taking of Dick-
son's auto and wallet.
Bullock and Tucker had separate trials. The jury found Tucker
guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The jury also con-
victed Bullock, but sentenced him to death." Bullock appealed to the
Supreme Court of Mississippi"I arguing that the evidence was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to submit to the jury and that the imposition
of the death penalty was so disproportionate to his participation in the
crime as to violate the eighth amendment provision against cruel and
unusual punishment.' 2 The court rejected both of these contentions
and affirmed Bullock's conviction.' 3  After Bullock exhausted his
state post-conviction remedies, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi. 14 The district court denied the petition. On appeal, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
Bullock's death sentence was invalid in light of the intervening deci-
sion of Enmund v. Florida.5 Enmund held that the eighth amend-
8. Id.
9. The Mississippi Code provides in pertinent part:
(2) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in
any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases:
(e) When done with or without any design to effect death by any person engaged
in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery,
sexual battery ....
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 1985). Under Mississippi law a person who partici-
pates in a robbery can be convicted of capital murder if the murder was committed by a co-
conspirator in the course of a robbery, even though the defendant did not intend the murder.
10. Lucas, 743 F.2d at 246.
11. Bullock v. State, 391 So. 2d 601 (Miss. 1980).
12. Id. at 604, 606.
13. The court concluded that Bullock's punishment was not disproportionate to his degree
of culpability because the law of Mississippi provided that "any person who is present and
aiding and abetting another in the commission of a crime, is equally guilty with the principal
offender." Bullock, 391 So. 2d at 601, 614. The court reasoned further that because Bullock
was an "active participant in the assault and homicide committed upon Mark Dickson," his
punishment was not disproportionate to his guilt. Id.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. 1985).
15. Bullock v. Lucas, 743 F.2d 244, 246-48 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982)). The Fifth Circuit held that absent an Enmund finding by the jury that the
defendant either killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill, or contemplated that lethal force
would be used, Bullock's sentence was constitutionally infirm. When Bullock was found guilty
and sentenced to death, the then-existing Mississippi death penalty statute did not require an
instruction at the sentencing phase requiring the jury to focus on the defendant's personal
intent and culpability. The appellate court, therefore, focused on the confusing jury
instruction which would have allowed the imposition of the death penalty merely because the
defendant participated in the robbery "with or without any design to effect the death of the
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ment forbids imposition of the death penalty on one who does not
himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place, but
who aids and abets a felony in which a co-felon commits murder. The
appellate court thus granted the writ of habeas corpus vacating Bul-
lock's sentence. 6 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari because a Fifth Circuit interpretation conflicted with the
Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Enmund."7 The Supreme Court
of the United States held, modified and remanded: Enmund v. Flor-
ida does not constitutionally require specific jury findings on a defend-
ant's culpability; at what precise point a state chooses to make the
Enmund determination is of little concern from the standpoint of the
Constitution. Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689 (1986).
II. PERSPECTIVE
A. Pre-Bullock Death Penalty Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court's
Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
In Weems v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court postulated that
cruel and unusual punishment was a flexible concept which should
reflect society's changing values. Consequently, in light of the harsh-
ness of capital punishment, courts and juries infrequently imposed the
death penalty as punishment. There was such a lack of societal
acceptance in the 1960's that some commentators maintained that the
Supreme Court should find the death penalty unconstitutional. 19
In 1972, the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality
of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia.20 The Furman Court held
that statutes which give juries complete discretion to impose the death
penalty violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause.2' The Court
reasoned that giving juries total discretion in sentencing would lead to
arbitrary application of the law. The Court did not expressly indicate,
victim," regardless of the defendant's intent. Bullock, 743 F.2d at 248. See Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1985) (In 1983 Mississippi amended its death penalty statute to require
a written finding of intent as a prerequisite to imposing the death penalty.).
16. The court permitted the state of Mississippi to either impose a sentence of life
imprisonment or, within a reasonable time, conduct a sentencing hearing consistent with its
opinion.
17. See infra notes 63, 64 and accompanying text.
18. 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). The Court opined that the cruel and unusual punishment
clause "was not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice." Id.
19. See Note, Capital Punishment: A Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 52
NOTRE DAME LAW. 261, 268 (1976) (citing Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death
Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1818-19 (1970)).
20. 408 U.S. 228 (1972).
21. Id.
1986] 1025
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1023
however, that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se; rather,
the Court limited its holding to the facts of the particular case. Nev-
ertheless, the Furman Court did conclude that procedural safeguards
were necessary for the death penalty to be constitutional.22 Because
jury discretion in imposing the death penalty was a nationwide prac-
tice, the Furman decision precipitated the revision of all existing
death penalty statutes.23
Four years after the Furman decision, in Gregg v. Georgia,24 a
plurality of the Supreme Court25 held that the death penalty was not
unconstitutional per se. Although the Court acknowledged that the
death penalty was an extreme sanction, it determined that capital
punishment was suitable for the extreme crime of deliberate murder.26
The Gregg Court employed both a substantive and a procedural anal-
ysis to determine whether the death penalty was unconstitutional.27
The Court formulated an excessiveness test,28 which focused on two
factors: first, whether the punishment involved "the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain"; and, second, whether the punishment was
"grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime."'29 The Gregg
22. The Court, however, failed to enunciate any standards which would satisfy the eighth
amendment.
23. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (The Supreme Court of the United
States held that Florida's new death statute provided sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy
the concerns articulated in Furman.).
24. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
25. Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens wrote the plurality opinion in which Justices
Blackmun, Burger, Rehnquist and White concurred. Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissented. Id.
26. Id. at 187.
27. After the Gregg Court determined that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per
se, the Court addressed the procedural requirements of the eighth amendment. The Court
upheld bifurcated death penalty statutes which require that a trial judge or jury first determine
guilt or innocence and then, in a separate hearing, weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances to determine whether the state should impose capital punishment. Id. at 162-
68. Cf. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 248-51 (jury sentencing procedure held constitutional
because jury was given guidelines on which to base its decision). The Court, however, found
mandatory death penalty statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976) (striking down statute mandating death penalty whenever, with respect to five
categories of homicide, the jury found the defendant intended to kill or inflict great bodily
harm); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down statute requiring
imposition of the death penalty whenever defendant was convicted of first degree murder).
The Court held these statutes were unconstitutional because they allowed unbridled jury
discretion and failed to consider specific aspects of the defendant or the crime.
28. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
29. Id. at 173. The Court went on to note that the penological justification for imposing
the death penalty encompasses both the theories of retribution and deterrence. Because data on
death penalty deterrence was inconclusive, the plurality decided that the Court should defer to
legislative judgment on that issue. Id. at 184-86. But see Dressier, The Jurisprudence of Death
by Another. Accessories and Capital Punishment, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 17, 39 (1979) (The
purpose of the eighth amendment is to protect against legislative misconduct, and courts
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decision did not determine whether the death penalty was constitu-
tional for crimes other than murder, but it did conclusively alleviate
any doubt that death was a constitutional penalty for deliberate
murder.
Applying the excessiveness test formulated in Gregg, the
Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia30 addressed the issue of whether
the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment when
imposed for a crime other than murder. The Coker Court concluded
that the death penalty was an unconstitutional punishment for the
rape of an adult woman where the defendant did not take the victim's
life. 3 The Court noted that rape was a terrible crime, second only to
murder in its severity; yet, the Court maintained that rape did not
compare with the irrevocability of taking a human life.32 Based on
the Coker and Gregg decisions, it is logical to deduce that a death
must occur before the death penalty is constitutional. In Gregg, how-
ever, the Court's holding pertained only to an intentional murder and
left open the question of whether an unintentional killing constitu-
tionally justifies the imposition of the death penalty.
B. The Felony Murder Rule and the Death Penalty
The felony murder rule is applicable where two or more people
agree to commit a felony and a death occurs during its commission.
All co-felons are responsible for the death, even the co-felon who did
not directly cause the death.33 The rationale underlying this formula-
tion is that all participants should be responsible for the acts of their
coconspirators because the death would not have occurred but for the
underlying agreement to commit the felony.34 The felony murder
doctrine retains vitality in most jurisdictions,35 but the doctrine's util-
should ensure that this purpose is fulfilled.). The Court, however, considered retribution a
permissible objective. The Court reasoned that if it allowed the public to vent its outrage at
offensive conduct, and if the law did not punish the offender, the public would resort to self-
help. Id. at 183.
30. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
31. Justice White wrote the plurality opinion which held that even though the death
penalty in rape cases might serve a legitimate purpose for punishment, such as deterrence or
retribution, it was nevertheless disproportionate to the crime of rape.
32. 433 U.S. at 597-98.
33. See D. JONES, CRIME AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 132 (1978) (each co-felon is
responsible for a death caused by the act of one of them); 2 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW § 145, at 208 (14th ed. 1979) (Even if the co-felon is not the actual killer, he is
responsible for the death.).
34. See Crum, Casual Relationships and the Felony Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q.
191, 192-93; see also State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 548, 550 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) (The purpose
of the felony murder doctrine is to prevent the death of innocent persons.).
35. Both Hawaii and Kentucky have abolished the doctrine as a basis for liability.
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ity and fairness has been widely criticized.36 Such criticisms include
the doctrine's inequitable premise of transferred intent and the unfair-
ness of holding a co-felon responsible for a murder that was an unin-
tended and unlikely consequence of the underlying felony.37
The felony murder rule has its roots in English common law.38
At common law, the definition of murder was the unlawful killing of a
person with express or implied malice.39 If an unintentional killing
occurred during the course of a felony, the felony murder doctrine
supplanted the requisite malice necessary to charge the felon with
murder." The intent to commit the underlying felony transferred to
the homicide, thereby satisfying the malice requirement to prove mur-
der.41 Once the state establishes the intent to commit the felony, it is
irrelevant whether the killing was intentional or unintentional.42 The
doctrine's requirement that the killing take place during the perpetra-
tion of a felony is satisfied where the killing and perpetration of the
felony comprise one continuous transaction.4 3 Therefore, it may also
36. See, e.g., Packer, The Case for Revision of the Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. REV. 252, 259
(1961) ("The rule is unnecessary in almost all cases in which it is applied .... "); Note,
Criminal Law-The Felony Murder Doctrine Repudiated, 36 Ky. L.J. 106, 109 (1947)
(Punishment for murders occurring in the course of another crime can be imposed without use
of the felony murder doctrine.).
37. See Note, supra note 36, at 108-09 (1947); Note, Enmund v. Florida: The
Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty Upon a Co-Felon in Felony Murder, 32 DE
PAUL L. REV. 713 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutionality of Imposing the Death
Penalty].
38. The phraseology of the felony murder rule originally made all killings during the
commission of any unlawful act murder. The rule, however, was subsequently narrowed to
include only dangerous felonies likely to result in death.
39. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 195 (3d ed. 1884);
see also 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 51 (1909) (murder is "unlawful homicide with
malice aforethought"); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 1969) (murder is "homicide
committed with malice aforethought").
40. Lord Coke originally postulated the felony murder concept. See, e.g., 2 C. TORCIA,
supra note 33, at 204 (attributing responsibility for the felony murder doctrine to Lord Coke).
Contra M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2, at 247 (1936) ("The felony-
murder-rule has its origin as early as 1256, and appears in Bracton's De Legibus et
Consuetinibus A nglias.").
41. See R. PERKINS, supra note 39, at 45 & n. 19; see also Fleming v. State, 374 So. 2d 954,
956 (Fla. 1979) (commission of homicide in conjunction with intent to commit felony
supplants premeditation or malice aforethought needed for first degree murder). For a
discussion on felony murder as a legal fiction, see Comment, Constitutional Limitations Upon
the Use of Statutory Criminal Presumptions and the Felony-Murder Rule, 46 MISS. L.J. 1021,
1022 (1975) (felony murder is premised on a legal fiction that one who commits felony has
intent to commit murder).
42. See State v. Smith, 225 Kan. 796, 799-800, 594 P.2d 218, 221 (1979) (The court
reasoned that "[t]he participants in the felony must reasonably foresee or expect that a life
might be taken in the perpetration of a felony regardless of whether the killing was accidental
or intentional.").
43. See People v. Atkins, 128 Cal. App. 3d 564, 568, 180 Cal. Rptr. 440, 443 (1982);
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be irrelevant whether the killing occurs before or after the perpetra-
tion of the felony."
The scope of the felony murder rule varies with each jurisdic-
tion.45 Where the felony murder statute does not enumerate specific
felonies, the potential scope of the rule is broader, but limited by the
requirement that the applicable felony be inherently dangerous. 46
In 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Lockett v.
Ohio,4 7 cast doubt over the constitutionality of imposing the death
Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 686 (Minn. 1979); State v. Wayne, 289 S.E.2d 480, 482
(W. Va. 1982).
44. See, e.g., People v. Salas, 7 Cal. 3d 812, 823-24, 500 P.2d 7, 15, 103 Cal. Rptr. 431, 439
(1972) (killing while robbery in escape stage); Jenkins v. State, 240 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. 1968)
(killing during attempt to commit burglary).
45. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (1980) (kidnapping, sexual assault,
burglary, escape, robbery); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.1105(A)(2) (West Supp. 1982)
(sexual assault, child molestation, kidnapping, burglary, arson, robbery, escape); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1982) (arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-102(l)(b) (1978) (arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54c (West Supp. 1982) (robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault,
escape); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983) (trafficking, arson, sexual
battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, escape, aggravated child abuse, aircraft piracy,
unlawful discharging of a destructive device or bomb); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (1979)
(arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, mayhem); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(1) (Bums
1979) (arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, robbery);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 202(1) (1980) (murder, robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
arson, rape, gross sexual misconduct, escape); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609-185(2) to (3) (West
Supp. 1982) (criminal sexual conduct, burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, arson,
tampering with witnesses, escape); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-19(2)(e) (Supp. 1982) (rape,
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(1)(b) (1981) (robbery,
sexual intercourse without consent, arson, burglary, kidnapping, felonious escape); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-303(2) to (3) (1979) (sexual assault, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking,
burglary, administration of poison); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (1979) (sexual assault,
kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, sexual molestation of a child under the age of 14); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981) (arson, rape, sexual offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(l)(c) (Supp. 1981) (treason, robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
felonious restraint, arson, gross sexual imposition, escape); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.7(B) (West Supp. 1982) (forcible rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping,
escape, burglary, arson); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2502(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981) (robbery,
rape, deviate sexual intercourse, arson, burglary, kidnapping); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-16-4 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982) (arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, unlawful
discharging of destructive device or explosive); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(l)(c)
(1977) (robbery, rape, burglary, arson, kidnapping); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1977) (arson,
robbery, rape, burglary); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-10 1(a) (1983) (rape, sexual assault, arson, robbery,
burglary, escape, resisting arrest, kidnapping, administering poison).
46. See Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 506, 436 N.E.2d 400, 409 (1982).
The court held that although the statutory language made the felony murder rule applicable to
any felony, the felony must be inherently dangerous. Id. To extend the rule to less serious
statutory felonies, such as possession of burglary tools, is unwarranted. It is the inherent
danger of the felony which justifies equating the intent to commit the felony with the malice
aforethought necessary for murder. Id. at 506-07, 436 N.E.2d at 409-10.
47. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Lockett was sentenced to death for her participation in a robbery
during which a killing occurred. Id. at 594. She had remained in the getaway car during the
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penalty on nontriggermen 41 convicted of felony murder. The Court
subsequently clarified the issue in Enmund v. Florida,49 when it held
that the death penalty is a disproportionate sanction for felony mur-
der when the offender is a nontriggerman, unless there is a showing
that the co-felon took life, intended to take life, or contemplated tak-
ing a life.5 ° Enmund was convicted of two counts of first degree mur-
der under Florida's felony murder statute. Enmund's two cohorts5'
had actually pulled the trigger, and Enmund had driven the getaway
car.2 Nevertheless, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Enmund was present and had aided and abetted the perpetration of
the robbery. 3 In a separate sentencing hearing the jury recom-
mended the death sentence, and the trial judge so sentenced him.54
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed55 and held that the
death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for nontriggermen
like Enmund.56 Because the state had not proven that Enmund had
killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, the Court concluded that
the death penalty was so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.5" The
Court further reasoned that putting someone to death who did not kill
or intend to kill would not advance the deterrent or retributive goals
of capital punishment.5 8
robbery. Id. at 590. The Court's plurality opinion reversed the death sentence and held the
sentencing statute unconstitutional. The Court employed a procedural mode of analysis, rather
than addressing the substantive issue of whether the death penalty was constitutionally
disproportionate where the defendant had not killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Id.
at 609 n.16.
48. The term nontriggerman was used in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Nontriggerman refers to participants in felony murder who did not kill, attempt to kill, or
intend to kill. Id. at 792-93.
49. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
50. Id. at 798.
51. Sampson and Jeanette Armstrong shot and killed both Thomas and Eunice Kersey,
took their money and fled. Id. at 783-84.
52. Id.
53. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Enmund's convictions and sentences. 399 So.
2d 1362 (Fla. 1981). The court relied on Adams v. State, which held that the interaction of the
"felony murder rule and the laws of principals combine to make a co-felon generally
responsible for the lethal acts of his co-felon." Id. at 1369 (quoting Adams v. State, 341 So. 2d
765, 768-69 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977)).
54. Enmund, 399 So. 2d at 1363.
55. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
56. Id. at 794-96.
57. Id. at 798.
58. Id. at 798-801. For an excellent discussion ofEnmund v. Florida, see Note, Imposing
the Death Sentence for Felony Murder on a Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Imposing the Death Sentence]; Comment, The Felony Murder Rule
and the Death Penalty: Enmund v. Florida---Overreaching by the Supreme Court?, 19 NEW
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The Enmund decision marked a significant advance in the devel-
opment of eighth amendment jurisprudence, but it left many ques-
tions unanswered. The decision is problematic because the Court
neither articulated an explicit standard for the requisite level of
intent,59 nor clarified whether the death penalty could withstand con-
stitutional scrutiny when applied to a nontriggerman who did not par-
ticipate in the murder, yet intended the victim's death.6' Moreover,
Enmund did not delineate the appropriate tribunal for determining
whether a defendant possesses the requisite degree of culpability
required for imposition of the death penalty. The Court subsequently
answered this question in Cabana v. Bullock.6'
III. Cabana v. Bullock: THE PROPER TRIBUNAL
A. The Majority
The Supreme Court entertained Bullock's petition for certiorari
in light of the conflicting interpretations of Enmund adopted by the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.62 The Bullock Court adopted the Elev-
enth Circuit's position that Enmund did not constitutionally mandate
specific jury findings of a defendant's culpability.63 The majority in
Bullock held that it was erroneous to conclude that Enmund could
only be satisfied at a sentencing hearing and by a jury determination
based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant pos-
sessed the requisite culpability."4 The Court65 explained that the
Enmund decision did not concern the guilt or innocence of the
ENG. L. REV. 255 (1984); Note, Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty, supra note 37,
passim.
59. The Court never specified whether the level of intent should be (1) specific, where the
actor commits an act with the specific objective or knowledge that the act will produce a given
result, or (2) general, where the actor deviates from reasonable conduct and the actor's ability
to foresee that such deviation might produce harmful results. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note
40, at 177-78; see also Note, Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty, supra note 37, at
734 (The author's interpretation of Enmund requires a new eighth amendment standard:
proof of specific intent to kill.).
60. For a discussion of the infirmities of the Enmund decision, see Note, Jurisprudential
Confusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 357, 370-71 (1984).
61. 106 S. Ct. 689 (1986).
62. See Reddix v. Thigpen, 728 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1984) (Enmund can be satisfied only by
findings made at the guilt or innocence or sentencing phase of a trial.). See also Ross v. Kemp,
756 F.2d 1483, 1488 (1 1th Cir. 1985) ("the question of whether the defendant's culpability
satisfies the eighth amendment is sufficiently distinct from the question of the defendant's guilt
that a specific jury finding is not constitutionally required").
63. Kemp, 756 F.2d at 1488. The Kemp Court stated: "We decline to transform... into a
constitutional requirement that the trier of fact make specific Enmund findings, such that
every defendant sentenced to death without express jury findings on culpability is entitled to a
new sentencing hearing." Id.
64. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 696.
1986]
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defendant;66 rather, the Enmund ruling was based on principles of
proportionality.67
Notwithstanding the traditional role of the jury in capital sen-
tencing, Justice White relied on the controversial case of Spaziano v.
Florida,6" which held that the Constitution does not require that a
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment be binding in capital
cases.69 The Court deduced from Spaziano that Enmund did not
require a jury finding that a nontriggerman, like Bullock, possess the
requisite culpability because "the decision whether a particular pun-
ishment-even the death penalty-is appropriate in any given case is
not one that we have ever required to be made by a jury."70 The
Court buttressed this position further by citing Solem v. Helm71 for
the proposition that throughout eighth amendment jurisprudence, a
trial judge or an appellate court is fully competent to determine
whether a sentence is so disproportionate as to violate a defendant's
constitutional rights.
The majority explained that Enmund did not impose any specific
procedure upon the states. The Court reasoned that if a person sen-
tenced to death was found to have killed, attempted to kill, or
intended to kill, regardless of who made that determination, his or her
execution would not violate the eighth amendment.72 Likewise, if a
person sentenced to death lacked the requisite culpability, any court
could remedy the situation.7 3 The Court maintained that, from a con-
stitutional standpoint, it was irrelevant at which particular time a
65. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined.
66. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 696.
67. Id. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (eighth amendment prohibits not only
barbaric punishments, but also those disproportionate to the crime committed). It is apparent
that the Solem Court viewed Enmund as a proportionality case because it described Enmund
as a case in which "the Court has applied the principle of proportionality to hold capital
punishment excessive ...." Id. at 288.
68. 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
69. Id. at 3165. See generally Mello & Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's Practice of
Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 31 (1985) (exploring
whether, as a matter of wise public policy, Florida should repeal its jury override); Radelet,
Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C.D. L. REV. 1409
(1985) (a focus on Florida's override provision and data on those who have been sentenced to
death under Florida law); Note, Eighth Amendment-Trial Court May Impose Death Sentence
Despite Jury's Recommendation of Life Imprisonment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 813
(1984) (examines the Supreme Court's departure from established method of analyzing capital
punishment statutes-the question of life or death must be left to the jury).
70. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 697.
71. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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state chose to make the Enmund determination.74
The Court, however, took a strong stance when a federal court
reviews, under a writ of habeas corpus, a claim that the death penalty
had been imposed on one who had neither killed, attempted to kill, or
intended that a killing occur.7 5 The Court emphasized that the
inquiry should not be restricted to an examination of the jury instruc-
tions, but should extend to the entire course of the state proceeding to
discern whether the requisite factual finding was made regarding the
defendant's culpability.76 Furthermore, if the reviewing court finds
-the court below had made the requisite factual finding, then it must
presume that the finding is correct by virtue of the federal habeas
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)." The habeas petitioner bears the
burden of overcoming this presumption and, unless he or she can do
so, there is no eighth amendment violation.78
Justice White next considered the proper cause of action for a
federal court faced with a habeas corpus petition raising an Enmund
claim. The Court entertained two possibilities: the federal court itself
could make the factual finding of culpability, or the federal court
could require the state judicial system to make the factual findings.79
Justice White opted for the latter, although he advocated that either
alternative would remedy an eighth amendment violation because
either choice would prohibit the execution of any defendant who had
not killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.80 In choosing the
second course of action, it is evident that Justice White balanced
underlying federalism concerns. He emphasized the respect which
federal courts owe state courts as the primary protectors of defend-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 697-98.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. 1985). See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)
(presumption of correctness applies to factual findings by both appellate and trial courts). But
see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (requisite factual findings as to the defendant's culpability is
presumed correct unless the respondent shall admit "that the fact finding procedure employed
by the state courts was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing" (emphasis added)).
There might be instances, therefore, where the presumption would not apply to appellate fact-
finding where such procedures were not adequate.
The Bullock Court conceded that the section 2254(d)(2) exception might exist, and
attempted to cure this flaw in its argument by stating "it is by no means apparent that
appellate fact finding will always be inadequate." See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying
text. See generally Project, Fourteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1983-84, 73 GEO. L.J. 789 (1984) (examining the
constitutional dimensions of habeas corpus relief).
78. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 698.
79. Id. at 699.
80. Id.
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ants' rights."1
The Bullock Court, relying on its earlier position that the eighth
amendment did not mandate a jury finding (as required in Enmund),
explained that a new sentencing hearing before a jury would also be
unnecessary in the state court proceedings.8 2 The Court, therefore,
concluded that Bullock's sentence would stand, provided that the req-
uisite findings were made in an "adequate proceeding before some
appropriate tribunal-be it an appellate court, a trial judge, or a
jury. 83
B. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bullock8 4 proposed that Enmund
established a constitutionally required factual predicate for the impo-
sition of the death penalty.85 He asserted that Enmund focused on
the individual defendant and his personal culpability 6 and that,
before a sentencer can condemn a defendant to death, an Enmund
finding must be made at the trial court level.17 Justice Blackmun
explained that Bullock was sentenced to die before the sentencer con-
sidered the fundamental issue of Bullock's culpability, which Enmund
required. Justice Blackmun maintained that the only way to cure this
violation was by providing a new sentencing hearing before a jury. 8
Justice Blackmun launched a magnificent attack upon the major-
ity's refusal to acknowledge the institutional limits placed upon appel-
late courts. The dissent correctly cited Caldwell v. Mississippis9 for
the proposition that certain institutional limits restrain an appellate
court's ability to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced
to death. 90 Caldwell emphasized the significant factors that a jury
might consider in its sentencing determination, and the defendant's
constitutional right to consideration of such factors by sentencers who
81. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
82. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 700.
83. Id.
84. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion.
85. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 702.
86. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
87. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 701.
88. Id. at 703. The dissent charged that the majority had misconstrued Enmund because
it held that the death penalty would not be carried out before someone made an Enmund
finding. In contrast, the dissent maintained that Enmund established a clear constitutional
imperative that a sentencer who failed to make an Enmund determination could not impose
the death penalty.
89. 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985).
90. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 701.
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are present to hear the evidence and see the witnesses. 9' The majority
failed to address the Ca/dwell decision, but nevertheless concluded
that the Supreme Court of Mississippi was competent to make an
Enmund finding based on the cold appellate record. 92 Justice Black-
mun was particularly disturbed by the majority's acknowledgment
that the defendant's culpability could turn on credibility determina-
tions that an appellate court could not accurately make.93
In contrast to Justice White's reliance on Spaziano v. Florida 94 as
binding precedent supporting the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun
relied on Spaziano to support his dissenting opinion. Justice Black-
mun explained that Spaziano concerned a Florida statute which made
the trial judge responsible for imposing the sentence in a capital case.
He concluded that a trial judge was more like a jury than an appellate
court, and therefore was in a better position to ascertain a witness's
demeanor and credibility.95 The dissent asserted that mere appellate
review of the sentence was inadequate, and it was imperative that
each defendant receive individual consideration. Justice Blackmun
concluded that the eighth amendment requires that the Enmund fact
finder be present at the trial to see and hear the witnesses. 96 More-
over, it requires that the sentencer make the Enmund finding before it
decides that a defendant must die.97
IV. COMMENT
Throughout a long line of death penalty cases, the Supreme
Court has emphasized the jury's function as the "guardian and articu-
lator of society's moral code and conscience in the criminal trial." 98
91. Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2640.
92. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 700-01. The Supreme Court of Mississippi examined the record
below to determine "whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that Bullock killed,
attempted to kill, or intended to kill," rather than whether Bullock actually did any of those
things. Id. at 707.
The dissent asserted that merely saying Bullock might have acted with the requisite
culpability did not satisfy Enmund. Id. at 708.
93. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 707-08. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1512 (1985)
(regarding credibility of witnesses, the trial judge is aware of variations in demeanor and tone
of voice which has a great impact on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said).
94. See supra text accompanying note 68.
95. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 705.
96. Id. at 704.
97. Id.
98. Note, Imposing the Death Sentence, supra note 58, at 867; see, e.g., Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (essential feature of jury is the "interposition between the accused and
his accuser of the common sense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community
participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or
innocence"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-20, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968)
(jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment must "express the
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Recently, however, the Supreme Court has taken a step backward by
deemphasizing this role.99 Cabana v. Bullock illustrates the Supreme
Court's willingness to further condone the diminishing role of the jury
as sentencers in capital cases.
The imposition of the death penalty should reflect the will of the
community."° Instead of reinforcing community values, however,
Bullock poses a threat to the longstanding role that the jury has
played in sentencing a defendant to death. The Bullock decision
clearly presented two divergent interpretations of Enmund. The
majority opined that the controversial decision did not concern the
defendant's innocence or guilt. 0 1 The dissent, on the other hand,
asserted that Enmund mandated that the trial court consider the
defendant's personal culpability before the sentencer condemned him
or her to death.12
Justice Blackmun primarily disagreed with the majority which
allowed appellate courts to determine that a defendant possessed the
requisite culpability.' °3 Justice Blackmun further suggested the
majority ignored the inherent institutional limits placed upon appel-
late courts."° Is the dissent's denouncement of the Bullock decision
substantiated? A close reading of Bullock reveals that the majority
explicitly stated that the sounder course of action would be for the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death" and "speak for the
community"); cf Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985) (defendant's death sentence
vacated because prosecutor told jury that it need not bear final responsibility for sentencing
defendant to death, because the state supreme court would review the sentence); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1977) (demonstrating the use of jury behavior to explore
contemporary community values).
99. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984) (Constitution does not require
that a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment be binding in capital cases).
100. For a discussion on the representativeness and competence of the jury, see Radelet,
supra note 69, at 1424-27.
101. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 696.
102. Id. at 707-08.
103. Id. at 701. The Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi closely mirrored Justice Blackmun's
dissent. 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985). Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Caldwell,
discussed the restraints on an appellate court's ability to determine whether defendants should
be sentenced to death:
Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination, few
can be gleaned from an appellate record. This inability to confront and examine
the individuality of the defendant would be particularly devastating to any
argument for consideration of what the Court has termed [those] compassionate
or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailities of humankind. When
we held that a defendant has a constitutional right to the consideration of such
factors, we clearly envisioned that consideration would occur among sentencers
who were present to hear the evidence and arguments and see the witnesses.
Id. at 2640.
104. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. at 700.
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state's own judicial system to make the factual findings in the first
instance."°5 The majority's problem is not alleviated, however,
because the judge is still making the factual determination, instead of
the jury.
The dissent's reasoning becomes problematic when Justice
Blackmun attempted to distinguish Spaziano v. Florida. He asserted
that in Spaziano the trial judge was responsible for imposing the sen-
tence in a capital case,10 6 and that he was more like a jury than an
appellate court in terms of viewing a witness's demeanor and credibil-
ity. Thus, the dissent conceded that a trial judge is capable of making
the requisite factual determination as well as the jury could.
Which is the correct interpretation of Enmund? Prior to the
Bullock decision, seven of the states that had addressed the Enmund
issue concluded that the sentencer had to make Enmund findings
before imposing the death sentence.0 7 It is apparent that the various
state supreme court interpretations were consistent with the Bullock
dissent. It is interesting to note, however, that Justice White, who
wrote the majority in Bullock, also wrote the majority opinion in
Enmund. Thus, it is reasonable that the Bullock opinion represents
the underlying intent of Enmund.10 8
V. CONCLUSION
Does Cabana v. Bullock truly pose a serious threat to the jury's
role in capital sentencing? Subsequent to Bullock's trial, Mississippi
passed legislation 09 delegating the task of determining a defendant's
culpability to the jury. If every state enacts legislation providing for a
jury determination regarding a defendant's culpability, the impact of
Bullock will be minimal. Is the significance of the Bullock decision
merely to send a message to state legislatures to enact statutes delegat-
ing the culpability determination to the jury? As a result of Cabana v.
105. Id. at 699.
106. See text accompanying notes 94 and 95.
107. State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 199, 665 P.2d 70, 81 (1983); People v. Garcia, 36
Cal. 3d 539, 556-57, 684 P.2d 826, 835-37, 205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 274-76 (1984); Allen v. State,
253 Ga. 390, 395 n.3, 321 S.E.2d 710, 715 n.3 (1984); State v. Stokes, 308 N.C. 634, 651-52,
304 S.E.2d 184, 195 (1983); Hatch v. Oklahoma, 662 P.2d 1377, 1382-83 (Okla. Crim. App.
1983); State v. Peterson, - S.C.-, -, 335 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1985); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-
19-191(7) (Supp. 1985).
108. But cf Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requirements of "individualized
consideration" as defined by Lockett were meant to apply at sentencing stage). The Enmund
Court relied on its decision in Lockett, but nevertheless chose to interpret Lockett's
requirement as applicable at the guilt stage. See Comment, supra note 58, at 277-78.
109. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1985).
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Bullock, the states must take the step forward to reemphasize the
jury's essential role in the death sentencing process.
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